永远有多远~~

哈哈，大家都知道这句话吧，天下无贼。昨天下午，师兄一个短信召唤，我们师兄弟5-6人赶回人大参加了当年明月的讲座，当时导师也在，可能不少师兄弟也是想和导师打个照面。

这个讲座是针对在职MPA班的讲座，明月也是人大新近的MPA学生，很多人从各种渠道看过他的书，这次来看，也多是目睹其人。

明月开头就提出，要讲点有意义的东西，但是满篇讲座下来，没有听到多少有意义的字眼。他可能忽视了，台下的观众们大多是有着一定阅历的公务员，还有零零散散的几个博士吧。见过的场面不算不多，但是连忽悠带扯淡的风格，也就是能在无知者面前摆一摆谱罢了。

明月是我的同龄人，相差年岁不过1-2岁。在我当年醉心于军事科技的时候，明月也醉心于明史，可能他把明史，明实录都读遍了。用一个略微稚嫩的价值判断，写出了调侃风格的明朝那些事，迎合了不少年轻读者的阅读兴趣，一股新史学扑面而来。

但是通篇讲座里面，明月反复强调的几个主题词，或多或少的都被我们这些人所知道，我甚至感觉，他的一些阅历和经验甚至不如台下我的某些师兄们。但是不容否认，他仍是同龄人中的佼佼者。感到庆幸的是，我的一些感悟和明月是类似的，摘录如下：

1，谦受益，满招损。为人不能太骄横，几千年了，还是枪打出头鸟。

2，感谢困难与磨难。温水煮青蛙的故事大家都明白，艰苦和磨难是人生最有益的教科书。

3，人要有信仰。信仰能给人带来最大的鼓动力和忍耐力，有志者，事竟成。

4，有德，也要有术。以德服人，以术御人。纷繁复杂的社会中，任何一个极端都会是牺牲品。

5，人要不断学习，不停思考。

当然了，我并不同意他的一些观点，摘录如下：

1，这个世界是操蛋的。明月不止一次的这么表述。我想起了太祖的话，与天斗，其乐无穷，与地斗，其乐无穷，与人斗，其乐无穷。只有我们满怀希望，展望未来时，生活或许才充满色彩。

2，美国很傻X。这句话有道理，但是也说明他没有怎么了解美国，我们要学美国什么？

我并不喜欢明月这种调侃江山，玩世不恭的态度，或许我被某些东西侵染的太多了吧。

The conventional wisdom regarding Social Security is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the system does—and does not—work. Nobel laureate and Hoover fellow Milton Friedman explains why it is time to end Social Security as we know it.

I have italicized “part” and “costs of transition” because they epitomize key defects in conventional wisdom.

Social Security has become less and less attractive as the number of current recipients has grown relative to the number of workers paying taxes, an imbalance that will only get bigger. That explains the widespread support for individual investment accounts. Younger workers, in particular, are skeptical that they will get anything like their money’s worth for the Social Security taxes that they and their employers pay. They believe they would do much better if they could invest the money in their own 401(k) or the equivalent.

But if that is so, why replace only part and not all of government benefits? The standard explanation is that this is not feasible because payroll taxes—or part of them—are needed to pay benefits already committed to present and future retirees. That is how they are now being used, but there is nothing in the nature of things that requires a particular tax to be linked to a particular expenditure.

The link between the payroll tax and benefit payments is part of a confidence game to convince the public that what the Social Security Administration calls a social insurance program is equivalent to private insurance, in that, in the Administration’s words, “the workers themselves contribute to their own future retirement benefit by making regular payments into a joint fund.”

Balderdash. Taxes paid by today’s workers are used to pay today’s retirees. If money is left over, it finances other government spending—though, to maintain the insurance fiction, paper entries are created in a “trust fund” that is simultaneously an asset and a liability of the government. When the benefits that are due exceed the proceeds from payroll taxes, as they will in the not very distant future, the difference will have to be financed by raising taxes, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. And that is true no matter how large the “trust fund.” The assurance that workers will receive benefits when they retire does not depend on the particular tax used to finance the benefits or on any “trust fund.” It depends solely on the expectation that future Congresses will honor promises made by earlier Congresses—what supporters call “a compact between the generations” and opponents call a Ponzi scheme.

The present discounted value of the promises embedded in the Social Security law greatly exceeds the present discounted value of the expected proceeds from the payroll tax. The difference is an unfunded liability variously estimated at from $4 trillion to $11 trillion—or from slightly larger than the funded federal debt that is in the hands of the public to three times as large. For perspective, the market value of all domestic corporations in the United States at the end of 1997 was roughly $13 trillion.

To see the phoniness of “transition costs” (the supposed net cost of privatizing the current Social Security system), consider the following thought experiment: As of January 1, 2000, the current Social Security system is repealed. To meet current commitments, every participant in the system will receive a government obligation equal to his or her actuarial share of the unfunded liability.

For those already retired, that would be an obligation—a Treasury bill or bond—with a market value equal to the present actuarial value of expected future benefits minus expected future payroll taxes, if any. For everyone else, it would be an obligation due when the individual would have been eligible to receive benefits under the current system. And the maturity value would equal the present value of the benefits the person would have been entitled to, less the present value of the person’s future tax liability, both adjusted for mortality.

The result would be a complete transition to a strictly private system, with every participant receiving what the current law promises. Yet, aside from the cost of distributing the new obligations, the total funded and unfunded debt of the United States would not change by a dollar. There are no “costs of transition.” The unfunded liability would simply have become funded. The compact between the generations would have left as a legacy the newly funded debt.

How would that funded debt be paid when it comes due? By taxing, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. There are no other ways. There is no more reason to finance the repayment of this part of the funded debt by a payroll tax than any other part. Yet that is the implicit assumption of those who argue that the “costs of transition” mean there can be only partial privatization.

The payroll tax is a bad tax: a regressive tax on productive activity. It should long since have been repealed. Privatizing Social Security would be a good occasion to do so. Should a privatized system be mandatory? The present system is; it is therefore generally taken for granted that a privatized system must or should be as well.

The economist Martin Feldstein, in a 1995 article in the Public Interest, argued that contributions must be mandatory for two reasons: “First, some individuals are too shortsighted to provide for their own retirement,” he wrote. “Second, the alternative of a means-tested program for the aged might encourage some lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.”

The paternalism of the first reason and the reliance on extreme cases of the second are equally unattractive. More important, Professor Feldstein does not even refer to the clear injustice of a mandatory plan.

The most obvious example is a person with AIDS, who has a short life expectancy and limited financial means, yet would be required to use a significant fraction of his or her earnings to accumulate what is almost certain to prove a worthless asset.

More generally, the fraction of a person’s income that it is reasonable for her or him to set aside for retirement depends on that person’s circumstances and values. It makes no more sense to specify a minimum fraction for all people than to mandate a minimum fraction of income that must be spent on housing or transportation. Our general presumption is that individuals can best judge for themselves how to use their resources. Mr. Feldstein simply asserts that in this particular case the government knows better.

In 1964, Barry Goldwater was much reviled for suggesting that participation in Social Security be voluntary. I thought that was a good idea then; I still think it is. I find it hard to justify requiring 100 percent of the people to adopt a government-prescribed straitjacket to avoid encouraging a few “lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.” I suspect that, in a voluntary system, many fewer elderly people would qualify for the means-tested amount from imprudence or deliberation than from misfortune.

I have no illusions about the political feasibility of moving to a strictly voluntary system. The tyranny of the status quo and the vested interests that have been created are too strong. I believe, however, that the ongoing discussion about privatizing Social Security would benefit from paying more attention to fundamentals rather than dwelling simply on the nuts and bolts of privatization.

Available from the Hoover Press is The Essence of Friedman, a volume of essays by the Nobel laureate economist. Also available is Facing the Age Wave, David Wise, editor. To

The conventional wisdom regarding Social Security is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the system does—and does not—work. Nobel laureate and Hoover fellow Milton Friedman explains why it is time to end Social Security as we know it.

The journalist Michael Barone recently summed up the conventional wisdom about reforming Social Security: “The content of the reform is fairly clear—individual investment accounts to replace part of the government benefits financed by the payroll tax, later retirement ages, adjusted cost of living increases,” he wrote. And, he added, “suddenly the money to pay for the costs of transition is at hand, in the form of a budget surplus.”

I have italicized “part” and “costs of transition” because they epitomize key defects in conventional wisdom.

Social Security has become less and less attractive as the number of current recipients has grown relative to the number of workers paying taxes, an imbalance that will only get bigger. That explains the widespread support for individual investment accounts. Younger workers, in particular, are skeptical that they will get anything like their money’s worth for the Social Security taxes that they and their employers pay. They believe they would do much better if they could invest the money in their own 401(k) or the equivalent.

But if that is so, why replace only part and not all of government benefits? The standard explanation is that this is not feasible because payroll taxes—or part of them—are needed to pay benefits already committed to present and future retirees. That is how they are now being used, but there is nothing in the nature of things that requires a particular tax to be linked to a particular expenditure.

The link between the payroll tax and benefit payments is part of a confidence game to convince the public that what the Social Security Administration calls a social insurance program is equivalent to private insurance, in that, in the Administration’s words, “the workers themselves contribute to their own future retirement benefit by making regular payments into a joint fund.”

Balderdash. Taxes paid by today’s workers are used to pay today’s retirees. If money is left over, it finances other government spending—though, to maintain the insurance fiction, paper entries are created in a “trust fund” that is simultaneously an asset and a liability of the government. When the benefits that are due exceed the proceeds from payroll taxes, as they will in the not very distant future, the difference will have to be financed by raising taxes, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. And that is true no matter how large the “trust fund.” The assurance that workers will receive benefits when they retire does not depend on the particular tax used to finance the benefits or on any “trust fund.” It depends solely on the expectation that future Congresses will honor promises made by earlier Congresses—what supporters call “a compact between the generations” and opponents call a Ponzi scheme.

The present discounted value of the promises embedded in the Social Security law greatly exceeds the present discounted value of the expected proceeds from the payroll tax. The difference is an unfunded liability variously estimated at from $4 trillion to $11 trillion—or from slightly larger than the funded federal debt that is in the hands of the public to three times as large. For perspective, the market value of all domestic corporations in the United States at the end of 1997 was roughly $13 trillion.

To see the phoniness of “transition costs” (the supposed net cost of privatizing the current Social Security system), consider the following thought experiment: As of January 1, 2000, the current Social Security system is repealed. To meet current commitments, every participant in the system will receive a government obligation equal to his or her actuarial share of the unfunded liability.

For those already retired, that would be an obligation—a Treasury bill or bond—with a market value equal to the present actuarial value of expected future benefits minus expected future payroll taxes, if any. For everyone else, it would be an obligation due when the individual would have been eligible to receive benefits under the current system. And the maturity value would equal the present value of the benefits the person would have been entitled to, less the present value of the person’s future tax liability, both adjusted for mortality.

The result would be a complete transition to a strictly private system, with every participant receiving what the current law promises. Yet, aside from the cost of distributing the new obligations, the total funded and unfunded debt of the United States would not change by a dollar. There are no “costs of transition.” The unfunded liability would simply have become funded. The compact between the generations would have left as a legacy the newly funded debt.

How would that funded debt be paid when it comes due? By taxing, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. There are no other ways. There is no more reason to finance the repayment of this part of the funded debt by a payroll tax than any other part. Yet that is the implicit assumption of those who argue that the “costs of transition” mean there can be only partial privatization.

The payroll tax is a bad tax: a regressive tax on productive activity. It should long since have been repealed. Privatizing Social Security would be a good occasion to do so. Should a privatized system be mandatory? The present system is; it is therefore generally taken for granted that a privatized system must or should be as well.

The economist Martin Feldstein, in a 1995 article in the Public Interest, argued that contributions must be mandatory for two reasons: “First, some individuals are too shortsighted to provide for their own retirement,” he wrote. “Second, the alternative of a means-tested program for the aged might encourage some lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.”

The paternalism of the first reason and the reliance on extreme cases of the second are equally unattractive. More important, Professor Feldstein does not even refer to the clear injustice of a mandatory plan.

The most obvious example is a person with AIDS, who has a short life expectancy and limited financial means, yet would be required to use a significant fraction of his or her earnings to accumulate what is almost certain to prove a worthless asset.

More generally, the fraction of a person’s income that it is reasonable for her or him to set aside for retirement depends on that person’s circumstances and values. It makes no more sense to specify a minimum fraction for all people than to mandate a minimum fraction of income that must be spent on housing or transportation. Our general presumption is that individuals can best judge for themselves how to use their resources. Mr. Feldstein simply asserts that in this particular case the government knows better.

In 1964, Barry Goldwater was much reviled for suggesting that participation in Social Security be voluntary. I thought that was a good idea then; I still think it is. I find it hard to justify requiring 100 percent of the people to adopt a government-prescribed straitjacket to avoid encouraging a few “lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.” I suspect that, in a voluntary system, many fewer elderly people would qualify for the means-tested amount from imprudence or deliberation than from misfortune.

I have no illusions about the political feasibility of moving to a strictly voluntary system. The tyranny of the status quo and the vested interests that have been created are too strong. I believe, however, that the ongoing discussion about privatizing Social Security would benefit from paying more attention to fundamentals rather than dwelling simply on the nuts and bolts of privatization.

Reprinted with minor editorial changes from the New York Times, January 11, 1999, from an article entitled “Social Security Chimeras.” Reprinted by permission.

Available from the Hoover Press is The Essence of Friedman, a volume of essays by the Nobel laureate economist. Also available is Facing the Age Wave, David Wise, editor. To

The conventional wisdom regarding Social Security is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the system does—and does not—work. Nobel laureate and Hoover fellow Milton Friedman explains why it is time to end Social Security as we know it.

The journalist Michael Barone recently summed up the conventional wisdom about reforming Social Security: “The content of the reform is fairly clear—individual investment accounts to replace part of the government benefits financed by the payroll tax, later retirement ages, adjusted cost of living increases,” he wrote. And, he added, “suddenly the money to pay for the costs of transition is at hand, in the form of a budget surplus.”

I have italicized “part” and “costs of transition” because they epitomize key defects in conventional wisdom.

Social Security has become less and less attractive as the number of current recipients has grown relative to the number of workers paying taxes, an imbalance that will only get bigger. That explains the widespread support for individual investment accounts. Younger workers, in particular, are skeptical that they will get anything like their money’s worth for the Social Security taxes that they and their employers pay. They believe they would do much better if they could invest the money in their own 401(k) or the equivalent.

But if that is so, why replace only part and not all of government benefits? The standard explanation is that this is not feasible because payroll taxes—or part of them—are needed to pay benefits already committed to present and future retirees. That is how they are now being used, but there is nothing in the nature of things that requires a particular tax to be linked to a particular expenditure.

The link between the payroll tax and benefit payments is part of a confidence game to convince the public that what the Social Security Administration calls a social insurance program is equivalent to private insurance, in that, in the Administration’s words, “the workers themselves contribute to their own future retirement benefit by making regular payments into a joint fund.”

Balderdash. Taxes paid by today’s workers are used to pay today’s retirees. If money is left over, it finances other government spending—though, to maintain the insurance fiction, paper entries are created in a “trust fund” that is simultaneously an asset and a liability of the government. When the benefits that are due exceed the proceeds from payroll taxes, as they will in the not very distant future, the difference will have to be financed by raising taxes, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. And that is true no matter how large the “trust fund.” The assurance that workers will receive benefits when they retire does not depend on the particular tax used to finance the benefits or on any “trust fund.” It depends solely on the expectation that future Congresses will honor promises made by earlier Congresses—what supporters call “a compact between the generations” and opponents call a Ponzi scheme.

The present discounted value of the promises embedded in the Social Security law greatly exceeds the present discounted value of the expected proceeds from the payroll tax. The difference is an unfunded liability variously estimated at from $4 trillion to $11 trillion—or from slightly larger than the funded federal debt that is in the hands of the public to three times as large. For perspective, the market value of all domestic corporations in the United States at the end of 1997 was roughly $13 trillion.

To see the phoniness of “transition costs” (the supposed net cost of privatizing the current Social Security system), consider the following thought experiment: As of January 1, 2000, the current Social Security system is repealed. To meet current commitments, every participant in the system will receive a government obligation equal to his or her actuarial share of the unfunded liability.

For those already retired, that would be an obligation—a Treasury bill or bond—with a market value equal to the present actuarial value of expected future benefits minus expected future payroll taxes, if any. For everyone else, it would be an obligation due when the individual would have been eligible to receive benefits under the current system. And the maturity value would equal the present value of the benefits the person would have been entitled to, less the present value of the person’s future tax liability, both adjusted for mortality.

The result would be a complete transition to a strictly private system, with every participant receiving what the current law promises. Yet, aside from the cost of distributing the new obligations, the total funded and unfunded debt of the United States would not change by a dollar. There are no “costs of transition.” The unfunded liability would simply have become funded. The compact between the generations would have left as a legacy the newly funded debt.

How would that funded debt be paid when it comes due? By taxing, borrowing, creating money, or reducing other government spending. There are no other ways. There is no more reason to finance the repayment of this part of the funded debt by a payroll tax than any other part. Yet that is the implicit assumption of those who argue that the “costs of transition” mean there can be only partial privatization.

The payroll tax is a bad tax: a regressive tax on productive activity. It should long since have been repealed. Privatizing Social Security would be a good occasion to do so. Should a privatized system be mandatory? The present system is; it is therefore generally taken for granted that a privatized system must or should be as well.

The economist Martin Feldstein, in a 1995 article in the Public Interest, argued that contributions must be mandatory for two reasons: “First, some individuals are too shortsighted to provide for their own retirement,” he wrote. “Second, the alternative of a means-tested program for the aged might encourage some lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.”

The paternalism of the first reason and the reliance on extreme cases of the second are equally unattractive. More important, Professor Feldstein does not even refer to the clear injustice of a mandatory plan.

The most obvious example is a person with AIDS, who has a short life expectancy and limited financial means, yet would be required to use a significant fraction of his or her earnings to accumulate what is almost certain to prove a worthless asset.

More generally, the fraction of a person’s income that it is reasonable for her or him to set aside for retirement depends on that person’s circumstances and values. It makes no more sense to specify a minimum fraction for all people than to mandate a minimum fraction of income that must be spent on housing or transportation. Our general presumption is that individuals can best judge for themselves how to use their resources. Mr. Feldstein simply asserts that in this particular case the government knows better.

In 1964, Barry Goldwater was much reviled for suggesting that participation in Social Security be voluntary. I thought that was a good idea then; I still think it is. I find it hard to justify requiring 100 percent of the people to adopt a government-prescribed straitjacket to avoid encouraging a few “lower-income individuals to make no provision for their old age deliberately, knowing that they would receive the means-tested amount.” I suspect that, in a voluntary system, many fewer elderly people would qualify for the means-tested amount from imprudence or deliberation than from misfortune.

I have no illusions about the political feasibility of moving to a strictly voluntary system. The tyranny of the status quo and the vested interests that have been created are too strong. I believe, however, that the ongoing discussion about privatizing Social Security would benefit from paying more attention to fundamentals rather than dwelling simply on the nuts and bolts of privatization.

Reprinted with minor editorial changes from the New York Times, January 11, 1999, from an article entitled “Social Security Chimeras.” Reprinted by permission.

Available from the Hoover Press is The Essence of Friedman, a volume of essays by the Nobel laureate economist. Also available is Facing the Age Wave, David Wise, editor. To order, call 800-935-2882.

Milton Friedman, recipient of the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize for economic science, was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution from 1977 to 2006. He passed away on Nov. 16, 2006. He was also the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago, where he taught from 1946 to 1976, and a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research from 1937 to 1981.

 order, call 800-935-2882.

Milton Friedman, recipient of the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize for economic science, was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution from 1977 to 2006. He passed away on Nov. 16, 2006. He was also the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago, where he taught from 1946 to 1976, and a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research from 1937 to 1981.

 order, call 800-935-2882.

Milton Friedman, recipient of the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize for economic science, was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution from 1977 to 2006. He passed away on Nov. 16, 2006. He was also the Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago, where he taught from 1946 to 1976, and a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research from 1937 to 1981.

从上小学到现在，在学校呆了20多年了，人家无期徒刑才20年，我这一呆可就23个念头过去了。 无期，还加上3年。够死缓了。哈哈。 可不嘛，自从上了大学，就是一次又一次的给自己死缓。 读了硕士，又读了博士，现在是个老油条了。 今天晚上，AA的天气十分配合我的心情，风雨大作。 论文终于完成了，导师已经签字，进入答辩阶段。 经过了这么些年，毕业就得了这篇论文。 前后一共12万多字，加上附注之类，有13w7的样子。一共有190多页。 不管怎么样，告一段落了。读书20多年，终于快完了。 下一个30年，估计是在单位里度过的，等到我65岁退休的时候，不知道又会是什么样的一种心情。 学校的博士做完了。又要开是做小学生了。从社会小学开始。

读书之前就会唱，马上就读完了书了，才觉得这歌唱的又朴实又深刻 小呀嘛小二郎 背着那书包上学堂 不怕太阳晒 也不怕那风雨狂 只怕先生骂我笨 没有学问无颜见爹娘 没有学问无颜见爹娘 小呀嘛小二郎 背着那书包上学堂 不是为做官 也不是为面子管 只为穷人要翻身 不受人欺负 哎不做牛和羊 不受人欺负 哎不做牛和羊 /

从昨天开始，执行公司对保洁人员制定的新工作制度，由之前的一天两班清洁员工作，改为一天三班。工作时间由之前的一天9小时改为8小时。这样看似合理，工作的时间少了，但活还是那么多，也没有了加班费，这就意味着收入会少很多。 　　在霍营站工作的保洁员小张称，之前他们每个月能拿到1200元左右，其中有二三百元是通过加班挣来的。如果按照新的制度，他们只能拿到900多元的工资。/p>

每天八小时工作制，是劳动法规定的，包括加班时间，劳动法都有明确规定，每天多少小时，每季度加班不能超过多少。但是对于低收入的职工来说，他们不讲这一套，他们只想多挣钱。

就像我此前的一篇文章中所写的那样，这是over employment，也是就业不充分的表现。特别是在二元劳动力市场中的低收入职工那部分，过度就业现象很明显，但是怎么办呢？世界上到现在也没有什么好法子。中国目前最严重的不是失业，而是严重的就业不充分。方法不在于就业政策，而在于经济体制，在于大量垄断影响了就业和效率。

高校为贫困生推出2元套餐遇冷

女大学生不堪就业压力自杀

人活着是要有尊严的，这种明显低于市价的午饭受到贫困生的排斥，是必然的。明显的是好心办坏事的表现。这又让我想起社会救助法中，我国独创的资格审查政策。通过群众评议，民主监督的方式进行。群众评议，可以选出谁富，但是能选出谁穷吗？在市场经济中，是个谁穷谁丢人，大家正想致富的环境，这种评议只能让一些人忍气吞声的过日子。

当然很多人会说，死要面子活受罪，试想，面子是俗话，人们被人尊重才是重要的。穷人也有自己的尊严啊。所以西方国家的救助制度中，就没有这种方式进行。就是连很隐蔽的食品券，一些穷人都不愿意申领，原因就是觉得没有尊严。这是个问题。

解决这个问题的办法并不难，难得就是没人去想，没人去做。

就业压力大，是今年的普遍现象，别说大学生，就是我们也能感到凛冽的就业形势。目前我专业的一个也没有真正落实就业问题，我的工作也是没影子的事情，作为研究者，我们要问，到底是哪些行业就业困难，到底是在哪些地方就业困难。

答案当然有，就业最密集的是大城市，北京、上海，深圳等各省会城市。其次，求职者争相涌入的都是政府部门、外企和国字头的大企业。

为什么是这些地方，为什么使这些企业？这是不是个问题？

看到温总理说，我大学毕业就想到西部去搞研究。但是几十万去西部的大中专学生，出了多少科学家，多少企业家，多少省部级干部。而留在大城市的又怎么样。如果考虑收入的正态分布，哪个均值更高。理性的人当人会选择后者，来规避风险。

来到美国，我发现我们国家不是没有可建设的，不是没有可发展的，而是一些机制、体制，制约了我们人力资源的发挥。当一个满怀憧憬的大学生去西部的时候，他可能永远留在那，他的子女可能获得很差的教育环境，他的生活质量远低于东部地区。在没有实现发展机会的均等化之前，大学生求职难必将继续存在。现在新一轮的开发已经开始，但是排在前头的还是长三角，珠三角，环渤海。东北老工业基地没有，中部的武汉，长沙有一些，西部的重庆有一些，但广大的西北还是没有，这就是发展机会的不平等。

这两年，还有一个损招就是鼓励大学生创业，我觉得是痴心妄想。大学生补缺法理想，但是让他们创业是太天真的想法了，试看创业，有几个成功的吧。一把书本知识的情况下，去创业，无非是一条死胡同。

今天AA 一天的大雪，天刚刚放晴了，感觉真好。呵呵。论文进展也快了。 找到一张好玩的图片，发上来娱乐一下。